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Antoni Cunyat and Randolph Sloof** 1 Introduction
A major research theme within organizational economics is how to motivate employees to exert well-
directed e⁄ort. This issue is typically addressed using the principal-agent model as point of departure.
In the standard version of this model the agent is assumed to solely care about his own monetary
compensation and to dislike e⁄ort. Similarly so, the principal just wants to maximize her own net pro￿t
and does not care about the agent￿ s well-being. Given these assumptions it is derived how monetary
incentives should be optimally designed to motivate the agent to put in su¢ cient e⁄ort.
Many empirical studies have found, however, that people may have alternative motivations that
go beyond material self-interest. Fairness, altruism, empathy and a preference to react in kind to kind
or unkind actions of others (reciprocity) are among the various alternative motivations identi￿ed. The
presence of such ￿ social preferences￿may have profound implications for the provision of e⁄ort incentives.
One of these is that they may make non-enforceable, ￿ implicit￿contracts possible. Workers are more
easily persuaded to exert e⁄ort when they know that their manager cares about their well-being and
thus will reward higher e⁄ort with a larger (non-contractible) bonus. E⁄ort levels will then be higher in
equilibrium, thereby increasing e¢ ciency. For this reason it may actually pay for ￿rms to select and hire
￿ empathic￿managers who do not solely care about pro￿t maximization; their personality type helps in
overcoming a di¢ cult incentive problem with the workers (cf. Rotemberg and Saloner (1993), Rotemberg
(1994), and Hermalin (2001, Section 4.2)). In the same spirit, ￿rms may want to assign particular
preference types within their work force to jobs where these social preferences are most e⁄ective.
In this paper we intend to test empirically whether organizations indeed make e⁄ective use of man-
agers￿social preferences to motivate workers. We do so by studying whether the organizational design
chosen optimally exploits the existing social preferences within the work force.1 Because it is notoriously
di¢ cult to gather ￿eld data on this, we make use of laboratory experiments to test the relevant theo-
retical predictions at hand. Compared to the existing literature, a novel and important feature of our
experiment is that we explicitly study how organizational design choices and the endogenous allocation
of jobs to employees vary with the observed characteristics (￿ track records￿ ) of these employees.
In our experiment we simplify matters by assuming that there are two organizational modes, each
corresponding to a di⁄erent role for managers. In the ￿rst type managers are hired to inspire and to
motivate the work force. Rather than implementing a system based on explicit incentive contracts and
active monitoring, managers should instill and maintain a culture that hard work will be rewarded by the
organization. This implicit contract then substitutes for a more costly explicit performance measurement
and evaluation system. We capture this organizational mode in highly reduced form with motivation
game M depicted in Figure 1a below. This game corresponds to the trust game used by Kreps (1990)
to model corporate culture and also to a simpli￿ed version of the game used by Rotemberg and Saloner
(1993) to study the impact of leadership style on workers￿incentives to innovate.2
[ Insert Figure 1 about here ]
1We thus leave aside the issue of (self-) sorting of employees into ￿rms. Recent theoretical papers focus on the endogenous
sorting of employees with heterogeneous social preferences into ￿rms with di⁄erent corporate cultures (see e.g. Kosfeld and
von Siemens (2007) and the references therein).
2In spirit the M-game corresponds to the ￿ loose supervision￿regime in the model of supervision and workgroup identity





Figure 1a. Motivation game M     Figure 1b: Inspection game IH [IL] 
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                730           550           580      490 In game M a worker ￿rst decides whether to shirk or to work. In case the worker shirks, he does not
get a reward (on top of his wage). If, however, the worker exerts e⁄ort, the manager decides whether to
reward him with a bonus or not. Because this bonus is non-contractible, a sel￿sh manager will not pay
it and, anticipating this, the worker will not work. But if the manager could credibly commit to pay the
bonus (only) when the worker exerts e⁄ort, the worker would be motivated to do so.
In the second organizational mode the role of managers is to supervise and to monitor that the
workers do not deliver substandard work (cf. Calvo and Wellisz (1978)). Workers receive a given wage
for putting in e⁄ort, but are ￿ned or ￿red whenever they are caught shirking. This mode is captured by
inspection game I depicted in Figure 1b, for high (IH) and low (IL) inspection costs separately. In this
game the manager ￿rst decides whether to monitor or not. If she does so, the worker will work for sure.
But if the manager decides not to monitor, the worker chooses between shirking and working. Payo⁄s
are such that sel￿sh workers will shirk if not monitored. Realizing this, the manager commits to monitor
in the ￿rst stage.3
Assuming sel￿sh preferences, the worker is predicted to work in mode I but not in mode M. In that
case the inspection mode is more e¢ cient and will be preferred by the owner of the ￿rm. Things change
when employees have social preferences. Putting a very empathic employee in the manager￿ s position
under mode M will then yield ￿rst best. This follows because, anticipating that he will be rewarded
by the empathic manager, the worker puts in e⁄ort and does not shirk. And compared to structure I,
organizational mode M saves on the costs of the monitoring technology.4 The M-mode thus becomes
relatively more attractive the more empathic the employees are. Moreover, because the M-mode relies
on empathic management, the owner will put the more empathic employees within the work force in the
manager￿ s role whereas in the I mode this is not the case. A ￿nal intuitive prediction is that the more
cost-e⁄ective the inspection system under mode I is, the less likely it is that the owner prefers mode M.
Lower inspection costs are represented in Figure 1b by having payo⁄s of 440 (instead of 360) after the
manager￿ s decision to monitor.
The experiment that we use to test these predictions has two parts. In part one subjects make
18 decisions in 9 di⁄erent games that all have the same entry-reward structure as in Figure 1. These
decisions are used to generate individual ￿ track records￿(ei,ri), with ei (ri) the number of entry (reward)
choices the subject made. This track record is taken as a (imprecise) measure of a subject￿ s preference
type.
In part two subjects either take the role of owner or of employee and in each period ￿rms consisting
of one owner and two employees are formed (based on a strangers design). Given the observed track
records of her two employees, the owner decides which employee becomes manager and who gets the role
3Game I re￿ects a simpli￿ed version of an inspection game where the manager can commit to a particular inspection
strategy. In a more general setup, the manager commits to a particular inspection probability, such that the worker is just
induced to exert e⁄ort with probability one; see Section 5 in Avenhaus et al. (2002) for a full discussion and justi￿cation
of this game. In their real e⁄ort experiment Dickinson and Villeval (2008) also use an inspection game in which the
principal/manager can commit ex ante to a given monitoring technology. For simplicity, here we restrict the manager to
inspection probabilities of either zero (no monitoring at all) or one (always monitor).
4This explains why the maximum joint payo⁄s for the worker and the manager under M (1100) are higher than the
maximum joint payo⁄s under I (980). Apart from installation and operational monitoring costs, another type of monitoring
costs is that the worker dislikes being monitored as it gives him the negative feeling of being controlled (cf. Frey (1993)
and Falk and Kosfeld (2006) who ￿nd that being monitored may lower work morale). Even if he works, his payo⁄s in the
inspection mode therefore depend on being monitored (either 360 or 440) or not (490). In the Appendix we provide an
elaborate justi￿cation of the particular parameterization depicted in Figure 1.
2of worker.5 After that the two employees take decisions in the organizational mode that applies. In the
￿rst ten periods the organizational mode is exogenously given (with ￿rst 5 times one mode and then 5
times the other), in the ￿nal 5 periods the owner ￿rst chooses the organizational mode before she assigns
roles. Employees￿payo⁄s are as in Figure 1 and the owner￿ s payo⁄s equal those of the manager (but are
private information to her).
Our main ￿ndings are as follows. First, in both modes employees with the ￿rst mover role are more
likely to ￿ enter￿the higher the ri value is of the second mover with whom they are matched. This
con￿rms that the more ￿ empathic￿second movers are, the higher the willingness of ￿rst movers to enter
the reciprocal relationship. Second, ￿rm owners seem to overlook this mechanism when assigning their
employees to di⁄erent roles. They naively assume that ￿rst mover decisions are mainly driven by the track
record characteristics of the ￿rst mover himself. As a result, in the M-mode they typically assign the
manager role (second mover) to the employee with the lower ri-value, i.e. to the less empathic employee.
These assignments appear suboptimal, because pro￿ts would have been higher if they would allocate roles
the other way around. Third, given suboptimal role allocation under the M mode, also the choice between
organizational modes is distorted. Nevertheless, the loss owners bear due to their suboptimal allocation
of roles is rather small and they in general do correctly realize that social preferences within their work
force make the M-mode relatively more attractive. Overall we therefore conclude that owners in our
experiment do recognize the importance of social preferences for organizational outcomes, but do not
make use of the available preferences within their work force to the fullest extent possible.
Numerous experiments have already been conducted that relate to the above discussed issues of
endogenous organizational design. In a series of important papers, for instance, Ernst Fehr and various
coauthors have studied the ￿rm￿ s choice of optimal incentive contracts. A main common ￿nding is that
social preferences can serve as a cost-e⁄ective contract enforcement device and contracts may therefore
deliberately be left incomplete.6 This suggests that in practice ￿rms may prefer implicit contracts
over explicit incentive contracts, although under sel￿sh preferences the latter would be optimal. Other
experiments focus on the relation between workers￿social preferences and their self-sorting into di⁄erent
pay for performance schemes (see e.g. Cabrales et al. (2007), Dohmen and Falk (2006), Eriksson and
Villeval (2004) and Teyssier (2008)). Also the e⁄ect of monitoring on worker behavior has already been
studied in the lab; see e.g. Dickinson and Villeval (2008) and Schweitzer and Ho (2005). Compared
to these experiments, we study (implicit and explicit) contracts and monitoring in highly reduced form
(cf. Figure 1). The main contribution of our study is that we explicitly relate these (reduced form)
organizational choices to the observed characteristics (￿ track records￿ ) of the employees that are to be
a⁄ected by these instruments. Apart from that, another new feature is that we explore the endogenous
allocation of roles within organizations.
This paper proceeds as follows. Assuming that employees may care about the well-being of others,
we ￿rst derive the formal hypotheses that are put to the test. Section 3 presents the details of our
experimental design whereas Section 4 reports the results. The ￿nal section summarizes and concludes.
5Clearly, in reality the manager￿ s and worker￿ s position may require di⁄erent capabilities and a given employee may not
be suitable for both positions. In the experiment we focus on a situation where such di⁄erences in ability requirements are
of lesser importance. A real world example in which this is the case is provided by the ￿eld experiment study of Bandiera
et al. (2007a, 2007b). They consider a soft fruit producing ￿rm where the main task of workers is to pick fruit, whereas
managers have to monitor the quality of picking and to organize logistics. Both managers and workers are hired from the
same population of Eastern European university students that are of similar age and background.
6See e.g. Fehr et al. (1997, 2007), Fehr and List (2004) and Fehr and Schmidt (2000,2004).
32 Theoretical predictions and hypotheses
Our experiment is based on the two games depicted in Figure 1.7 These games have the same general
decision structure, which is re￿ ected in Figure 2 below. Player A ￿rst chooses between Out and Enter.
If player A enters, player B subsequently chooses between Reward and No reward. Payo⁄s are such that
choosing No reward yields B the most in monetary payo⁄s, whereas Reward corresponds to sacri￿cing to
reward A for the ￿ kind￿choice to enter. From d > c > b > a it immediately follows that, if both players
are sel￿sh, (Out, No reward) is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium.
[ Insert Figure 2 about here ]
Social preferences may lead players away from the ine¢ cient (Out, No reward) outcome. Various
alternative motivations have been identi￿ed in the literature ￿ like fairness, altruism, empathy and
reciprocity ￿ and a number of theoretical models have been developed to capture these in a formal
way. Prominent examples include Fehr and Schmidt (1999)·s model of inequality-aversion, Charness
and Rabin (2002)·s model of quasi-maximin preferences, and Rabin (1993)·s model of intention-based
reciprocity (see also Dufwenberg and Kirschsteiger (2004)). Although these models can lead to quite
di⁄erent predictions in particular situations, a common theme they share is that social preferences may
be e¢ ciency enhancing. It is this common aspect that we want to emphasize here.8
To illustrate the impact alternative motivations may have, we capture them in a very simple and
stylized way. Let ￿i and ￿j denote player i￿ s and j￿ s monetary payo⁄s. Following Charness and Rabin
(2002), we assume that player i￿ s preferences take the following form (with i 6= j and i;j 2 fA;Bg):
Ui (￿i;￿j) = ￿i ￿ ￿j + (1 ￿ ￿i) ￿ ￿i if ￿i > ￿j (1)
= ￿i ￿ ￿j + (1 ￿ ￿i) ￿ ￿i if ￿i ￿ ￿j
In this speci￿cation, parameter ￿i gives the weight player i attaches to the other player￿ s payo⁄s when
she herself is ahead. Parameter ￿i re￿ ects the corresponding weight when she is behind. Without any
restrictions on ￿i and ￿i utility function (1) can capture a range of di⁄erent motivations. Charness
and Rabin (2002) use the results of a variety of simple games with a similar decision structure as in
Figure 2, to estimate the values of ￿i and ￿i. They ￿nd that on average players do not care about other
players￿payo⁄s when they are behind, but put a positive weight on the well-being of others when they
are ahead. In line with their estimates we therefore assume that 0 < ￿i < 1 and that ￿i ￿ 0. These
assumptions incorporate the inequality-aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999), which corresponds
to ￿i < 0 < ￿i < 1 and j￿ij ￿ ￿i. They are also in line with Hermalin (2001, Section 4.2), who assumes
that a player su⁄ers from ￿ remorse￿only if he is ahead.
7In the Appendix we discuss a basic reduced form model of endogenous organizational design that underlies these two
speci￿c games. This Appendix also discusses our choice of parameters and thereby motivates the monetary payo⁄s the
subjects earn in di⁄erent roles.
8Our experiment thus neither should be taken as an attempt to discriminate between various types of social preferences,
nor as providing a test of a particular version of social preferences per se. Although in this section we use quasi-maximin
preferences to derive and illustrate the main implications in a parsimonious way, similar predictions would have been
obtained under relevant alternative speci￿cations. For instance, incorporating Dufwenberg and Kirschsteiger (2004)￿ s type




Figure 2. General decision structure 
(with d > c > b > a and d+a ≤ 2c) 
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 Assuming preferences as in (1), the game is again easily solved by backward induction. Player B will
choose to reward whenever ￿B ￿ ￿￿ ￿ d￿c
d￿a. Anticipating this, player A enters only when ￿B exceeds
this threshold. Hence the predicted outcome is Out when ￿B < ￿￿ and (Enter, Reward) in case ￿B ￿ ￿￿.
(Outcome (Enter, No reward) is thus never observed on the equilibrium path.) This establishes that
when player B cares su¢ ciently about A￿ s well-being, the ine¢ cient outcome Out is avoided. Note that
￿i is the key parameter here. Following Rotemberg and Sloner (1993), we say that a player is more
empathic the higher his ￿i is. This yields our ￿rst main hypothesis.
H1 The more empathic player B is (i.e. the higher ￿B is), the more likely it is that player A enters.
Players A and B represent the work force of a given ￿rm. The role of owner of this ￿rm is captured
by player C, who decides on role assignment. In particular, given the empathy characteristics of her two
employees as re￿ ected by the ￿i-values, she decide which employee gets role A and who gets role B. For
ease of exposition we assume that, unlike her two employees, player C is sel￿sh. Her monetary payo⁄s are
equal to those of the manager and therefore depend on the version of the general game in Figure 2 that
is played. In the I-games the payo⁄s of player C equal those of player A, in the M-game they correspond
to those of player B.9 Because in equilibrium the outcome either equals Out or (Enter, Reward) and A
and B thus always obtain the same (either b or c), the predictions regarding role assignment are actually
the same for these two games. Player C prefers to assign role B to the more empathic employee, because
this maximizes the probability that the more e¢ cient outcome (Enter, Reward) is obtained.10
H2 Players C will assign the role of player B to the more empathic employee within her work force (i.e.
to the one with the higher ￿i-value).
A direct consequence of the above prediction is that managers (players A) in the inspection mode
will on average be more sel￿sh than managers (players B) in the motivation mode.
Apart from role assignment, player C may possibly also choose between game M and game I. These
two games di⁄er in the values of the payo⁄ parameters a through d. Here we simply work with the
numbers in Figure 1, but the reasoning applies more generally. In both games, the only two possible
equilibrium outcomes are Out and (Enter, Reward). Player C therefore prefers game M only if the latter
outcome is expected in that game. If not, player C prefers game I. The latter follows because the payo⁄
of 280 from outcome Out in game M falls short of both 360[440] and 490 in game IH[IL]. From the





, outcome (Enter, Reward) is expected in the M-game. Therefore, only if player C has an
employee within her work force with an empathy level that exceeds this threshold, she prefers game M:11
Hence we obtain that C is more likely to choose game M the more empathic her employees are.
9In the experiment player C￿ s payo⁄s are private information to her, so the observed behavior of A and B cannot be
driven by the actual payo⁄s player C obtains. This justi￿es that (1) does not include ￿C.
10Note that role assignment e⁄ectively makes a di⁄erence only when ￿i < ￿￿ < ￿j for employees i and j. Then the
outcome is (Enter, Reward) when employee j is put in the B-role and Out when employee i is put in the B-role. Because
c > b player C prefers the former assignment. Moreover, because in each of these two outcomes all players earn the same,
exactly the same predictions follow when player C is also guided by social preferences similar to those in (1):
11More generally this reasoning applies whenever bI > bM and cI < cM (with the superscripts of these payo⁄ parameters
referring to the type of game). As explained in the Appendix, the ￿rst inequality re￿ects the idea that the value of the
worker￿ s e⁄ort exceeds the overall costs of a formal monitoring system. Restriction cI < cM derives from the natural
assumption that installing a monitoring technology brings about (￿xed) investment costs, even when it is not actively used
in the end.
5Table 1: Overview of sessions and treatments (in part 2)
session rounds 1 ￿ 5 rounds 6 ￿ 10 rounds 11 ￿ 15
1 IL M IL versus M
2 M IL M versus IL
3 IH M IH versus M
4 M IH M versus IH
H3 The more empathic the work force is (i.e. the higher ￿i of the more empathic employee), the more
likely it is that player C prefers the M-game over the I-game.
Hypotheses H1 through H3 are the main predictions we want to test. Yet another interesting aspect
to consider is the role of inspection costs in the I-game. Higher inspection costs correspond to lower
payo⁄s attached to the Out outcome in this game (i.e. b = 440 in IL versus b = 360 in IH). If player
C would be perfectly informed about her employees￿empathy parameters ￿i, variations in these payo⁄s
would not a⁄ect the predicted outcomes (as long as these exceed the payo⁄s of the corresponding Out
outcome in the M-game). However, it seems reasonable to assume that parameter ￿i is employee i￿ s
private information. The owner may have a good idea about what the value of ￿i is, but she may not be
completely sure about its exact value. She is therefore unsure whether outcome Out or (Enter, Reward)
will result in each of the two games. Other things equal, her expected payo⁄s of choosing the I-game
are then lower the lower the value of parameter b in that game is. Player C is thus more likely to choose
game M over IH than over IL.
Clearly, also in the experiment employees do not observe the level of empathy of their colleagues
precisely, and neither do so owners C. Based on an observable track record of past choices, however, an
estimate ri of a player￿ s empathy level ￿i can be obtained. Exactly how individual track records are
generated in the experiment is explained in the next section.
3 Experimental design
Our experiment is based on a 2 by 3 treatments design. In each session we kept the two types of games
(game M and game I) ￿xed. Between sessions we varied the particular version of the inspection game,
having either the one representing low inspection costs (IL) or the other one with high inspection costs
(IH). We ran four sessions in total, which di⁄ered according to (the order of) the treatments considered.
Table 1 provides an overview. All sessions were run in May 2007 at the LINEEX laboratory of the
University of Valencia. Overall 180 subjects participated, with 45 subjects per session. The subject pool
consisted of undergraduate students at the University of Valencia. The vast majority of them (88%) were
students in Economics or Business, 57% were male. They earned on average 24:5 euros in somewhat less
than 2 hours, including a show up fee of 7 euros.
At the beginning of each session subjects were informed that the experiment consisted of two parts.
They were also informed that possibly some of the choices they made in part 1 would become observable
to some other participants in part 2. In particular, the instructions for part one explained that:12
12The experiment was conducted in Spanish. An English translation of the entire instructions can be found at the ￿rst
author￿ s website: http://www.uv.es/acunat/instructions_employee.pdf.
6Table 2: Overview of the nine games in part one
game A stays out If A enters, B chooses sacri￿ce reward ￿￿
(b;b) (a;d) vs. (c;c) d ￿ c c ￿ a
I (1400,1400) (950,3650) vs. (2750,2750) 900 1800 0.33
II (1800,1800) (200,2900) vs. (2450,2450) 450 2250 0.17
III (2200,2200) (200,2900) vs. (2450,2450) 450 2250 0.17
IV (1400,1400) (200,2900) vs. (2450,2450) 450 2250 0.17
V (1800,1800) (950,3650) vs. (2750,2750) 900 1800 0.33
VI (2200,2200) (950,3650) vs. (2750,2750) 900 1800 0.33
VII (1400,1400) (1250,3950) vs. (2600,2600) 1350 1350 0.5
VIII (1800,1800) (1250,3950) vs. (2600,2600) 1350 1350 0.5
IX (2200,2200) (1250,3950) vs. (2600,2600) 1350 1350 0.5






￿...It may happen that in part two some other participants get some information about
the decisions you made in part one. It may also happen though that none of your part one
decisions will ever become known to any other participant...￿
Apart from this information, subjects were kept ignorant about the actual content of part 2 until that
part actually started. The above announcement has the clear disadvantage that it may in￿ uence subjects￿
decisions in part 1. We considered it necessary though, in order to avoid any potential impression of
deception. Moreover, if we would not make the announcement, subjects would be surprised at the start
of part 2 when their choices of part 1 became known, and might think that it is quite likely that another
￿surprise￿will follow. This might then a⁄ect their behavior in part 2.
In part 1 subjects made decisions for a series of nine extensive form games that all have the same
decision structure as in Figure 2. We used a neutral frame for the entire experiment, with A￿ s choosing
between A1 (Out) and A2 (Enter) and B￿ s choosing between B1 (No reward) and B2 (Reward). Table 2
provides an overview of the games used. Subjects ￿rst made 9 decisions as player A, after that they made
9 conditional (on entry) decisions as player B. They did not get any feedback about the actual outcomes
of these games. They were just informed that at the end of the experiment one of the 18 choices made
in part 1 would be randomly selected and paid (see below for a more detailed explanation).
The nine di⁄erent games of part 1 have been chosen as follows. The ￿rst three games are just (￿ve
times) upscaled versions of the M-game, the IH-game and the IL-game, respectively. These games di⁄er
in two important ways. First, they correspond to di⁄erent ratios of the amount player B has to sacri￿ce
in order to give player A a particular reward. According to the theory discussed in Section 2, player B is
only willing to give this reward if his empathy parameter ￿i exceeds threshold ￿￿. This threshold di⁄ers
between the M-game and the two I-games, see the ￿nal column in Table 2. Second, the M and I games
also di⁄er in the amount player A forgoes by choosing to enter.
The remaining six games have been chosen using games I through III as starting point. Game IV
combines the payo⁄s of the ￿ stay-out￿option of the M-game with the sacri￿ce-reward values of the two
I-games. Games V and VI do so vice versa. The ￿nal three games combine the stay-out payo⁄s of games
I through III with equal sacri￿ce-reward values such that an ￿￿ of one half results.
We used part 1 to generate a ￿ track record￿for each individual. Such a track record consisted of a
7two-tuple (ei;ri), with ei;ri 2 f0;1;:::;9g the number of enter choices subject i made as player A and
the number of ￿ reward￿choices s/he made as player B. Under the assumptions of the theory spelled out
in Section 2, only decisions made as a second mover can serve as a proxy for social preferences. We
therefore (only) use ri as an estimate of a subject￿ s empathy level ￿i.
Part two of the experiment consisted of 15 periods. Subjects ￿rst learned their roles, being either an
owner ("person C") or an employee ("group member"). Subjects kept the same role throughout all 15
periods. Roles were assigned as follows. In each session we ranked the 45 subjects on the basis of the
number of ￿ right￿choices ri in their track record. Subjects with rank 16 to 30 were assigned the role of
owner and the remainder the role of employee. This procedure ￿unknown to the subjects ￿secured that
we had enough variation in empathy types among employees.
At the beginning of a period, ￿rms (called "groups" in the experiment) consisting of one owner and
two employees were exogenously formed. Matching was based on a stranger design. In each period
each owner was matched to two di⁄erent subjects from the lowest and highest tercile in the ranking of
r-choices, respectively. We made sure that each subject met each other subject only once. Subjects were
thus never confronted with the same ￿rm member again and were explicitly informed about that.
The 15 periods were divided into three blocks of ￿ve. In the ￿rst two blocks the game to be played
was exongenously given (see Table 1 above). Here the owner ￿rst decided, on the basis of the observed
track records (e1;r1) and (e2;r2) of her two assigned employees, which role to assign to each of them
(either A or B). Also the two employees observed the track record of each other. After employees were
assigned their roles, they played the game that applied, making decisions for the role assigned. This
determined their period payo⁄s, as given in the respective extensive form games. The owner received a
period payo⁄ equal to those of player A in the I-game and equal to those of player B in the M-game. To
easily remind owners about this fact, we labelled the I-game as game ￿Azul" and the M-game as game
￿Blanco" (and we printed these games against the corresponding background color). The complete setup
of the game was common knowledge, except for the payo⁄s of the owner, which were known to players
C only. We did so to prevent that employees￿decisions were guided by empathic feelings towards player
C. In the ￿nal ￿ve periods 11 to 15, the owner ￿rst chose which game to play. Once a game had been
chosen, the order of decisions was as before.
Except for the decisions made within their own ￿rm in a given period, subjects did not get any
information on how the other subjects behaved in part 2. Although they may have recorded the decisions
made by previous ￿rm members in earlier periods, this information is of limited value because they would
never meet with the same other subject again. The observable track records they obtained from part
1 were thus the main clue they could use to predict the behavior of other subjects within their ￿rm.
The track record of owners was never made public. Therefore, for one third of the subjects the decisions
made in part one remained private information throughout the experiment.
Payo⁄s were determined in the following way. From the ￿rst part one game was selected at random.
For this particular game subjects were then randomly coupled in pairs and were randomly assigned
roles.13 The individual payo⁄s that resulted from these pairings gave the earnings for the ￿rst part. To
this amount we added the overall payo⁄s from the second part. The conversion rate was such that 500
13Because we had an odd number of subjects within each session (45), we actually assigned 22 subjects the A-role and
23 subjects the B-role. The decision of one randomly selected A-subject was then used twice to determine the payo⁄s of
two di⁄erent B-roles.
8Table 3: Overall distribution of individual track records
number of e choices
# of r￿ s 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Total
0 10 11 9 4 4 3 1 42
1 1 2 4 5 5 4 2 23
2 2 5 1 7 1 2 18
3 2 5 3 6 4 3 3 1 27
4 3 6 13 5 4 2 33
5 1 2 3 4 6 1 17
6 1 1 2 1 1 6
7 1 2 1 4
8 1 1 2
9 2 1 1 1 3 8
Total 11 16 27 26 37 35 11 3 7 7 180
Remark: Numbers on the diagonal where ei = ri appear in bold.
points in the experiment corresponded with 1 euro in money. Apart from that, subjects received a show
up fee of 7 euros.
The experiment was computerized using the z-tree programming package (cf. Fischbacher (2007)).
Subjects started with written instructions for the ￿rst part, which were also read aloud by the experi-
menter. At the end of the ￿rst part subjects received new instructions for the second part. Before the
second part started, subjects played one practice period. After ￿nishing the second part subjects ￿lled in
a short questionnaire. Having completed this, the experimental points earned were exchanged for money
and subjects were paid individually and discreetly.
4 Results
In this section we ￿rst describe the distribution of individual ￿ track records￿generated by the choices
subjects made in part one. Next we look at how players A and B behave in the three games M, IH and
IL at hand. We are particularly interested in testing our ￿rst hypothesis that A￿ s are more likely to enter
the higher the r-value of player B they are coupled with. The ￿nal subsection looks at the organizational
design choices made by players C. It is tested whether they assign the B-role to the employee with the
higher r-value and whether they are more likely to choose the M-game when this r-value is higher.
4.1 Individual track records
In part one each subject makes nine entry decisions as player A and nine (conditional) reward choices
as player B. From these 18 choices, an individual track record (ei;ri) results. Table 3 gives the overall
distribution observed for the 180 subjects in our experiment.
On average subjects choose to enter 3:76 times as player A and to reward on average 2:83 times as
player B. As the frequency distribution makes clear though, there is quite some heterogeneity. Most
observations are scattered around the diagonal, suggesting that the number of entry and reward choices
are correlated. Indeed, for our full sample of 180 subjects the Spearman rank correlation between e and
r choices equals 0:48 and is highly signi￿cant (p = 0:000). This also holds when we compute correlations
9Table 4: Number of outcomes by period for Game IL
Outcome Periods 1-5 Periods 6-10 Periods 11-15 Total
Out 62 (83%) 73 (97%) 70 (95%) 205 (92%)
E&N 7 (9%) 1 (1%) 2 (3%) 10 (4%)
E&R 6 (8%) 1 (1%) 2 (3%) 9 (4%)
Total 75 (100%) 75 (100%) 74 (100%) 224 (100%)
Table 5: Number of outcomes by period for Game IH
Outcome Periods 1-5 Periods 6-10 Periods 11-15 Total
Out 55 (73%) 61 (81%) 30 (75%) 146 (77%)
E&N 11 (15%) 5 (7%) 6 (15%) 22 (12%)
E&R 9 (12%) 9 (12%) 4 (10%) 22 (12%)
Total 75 (100%) 75 (100%) 40 (100%) 190 (100%)
for each of the four sessions in isolation. Moreover, many entries in Table 3 are above the diagonal. This
indicates that subjects typically choose to enter somewhat more often as player A than they choose to
reward as player B, which is corroborated by formal signrank tests.14
There are some minor di⁄erences in the observed track records across sessions. Comparing the number
of r-choices by means of a Kruskal-Wallis test, we do not ￿nd a signi￿cant di⁄erence (at the 5% level)
between the four sessions (p = 0:0723). For the number of enter choices there are some di⁄erences though
(p = 0:0131). Both ranksum and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests reveal that subjects in session 3 have a lower
e-value than those in sessions 1 and 4. In the former the average equals 2:87, in the latter two 4:13 and
3:96, respectively. But even in session 3 the average e-value (2:87) exceeds the average r-value (2:44).
The main observation of a substantial correlation between e and r-choices with (slightly) higher e-choices
thus applies to all sessions.
As explained in the previous section, after part one we ordered the subjects on the basis of their
r-scores and assigned those in the second tercile the role of player C. In sessions 1 and 4 these were
subjects with ri = 2 to ri = 4, whereas in sessions 2 and 3 these where subjects with ri = 1 to ri = 3
and with ri = 1 to ri = 4; respectively. Recall that in every period players C were assigned one employee
from the low-r group and another one from the high-r group.
4.2 Employees￿choices
To get a ￿rst impression of how players A and B behaved in part two, Tables 4 through 6 provide an
overview of the outcomes observed in the three di⁄erent games.
In periods 1 to 10 the game was exogenously given whereas in the last ￿ve periods it was endogenously
chosen by player C. The predominant outcome in game IL is that player A chooses Out. In the very few
instances that A chooses to enter, player B is about equally likely to reward (R) or not (N). The latter
also applies for game IH, but there player A is somewhat more likely to enter. Finally, in the motivation
game it is (much) more likely that player A enters than in the two inspection games. But there player
B also appears less likely to reward.
14Only in session 3 we do not ￿nd a signi￿cant di⁄erence (at the 5%-level) in indivivual e and r scores. But for the three
other sessions we do, as well as overall.
10Table 6: Number of outcomes by period for Game M
Outcome Periods 1-5 Periods 6-10 Periods 11-15 Total
Out 84 (56%) 98 (65%) 130 (70%) 312 (64%)
E&N 47 (31%) 40 (27%) 47 (25%) 134 (28%)
E&R 19 (13%) 12 (8%) 9 (5%) 40 (8%)
Total 150 (100%) 150 (100%) 186 (100%) 486 (100%)
The ￿rst hypothesis we want to test is whether player A￿ s are more likely to enter the higher the
r-value of player B they are coupled with. We do so by estimating a random e⁄ects probit model of the
probability that A chooses to enter. The four speci￿cations reported in Table 7 all include player B￿ s
r-value from his track record. Apart from that, in the ￿rst column two 0=1-dummies for respectively the
IH-game and the M-game are incorporated (so IL serves as baseline), together with a time trend ￿ period￿ .
The second column adds the remaining elements of B￿ s and A￿ s track record. These two speci￿cations
do not distinguish between whether the game played is the ￿rst or the second exogenous game played
in a row, or whether it is endogenously chosen by player C. Speci￿cations (3) and (4) add additional
zero-one dummies to identify potential order and treatment e⁄ects in this regard.
Before turning to the results obtained, it is important to point out that the coe¢ cient estimates in
Table 7 do not su⁄er from a sample selection bias. For sure, employees￿roles are not assigned randomly
but are endogenously chosen by players C. When C￿ s take the track records of their two employees into
account in making this assignment choice (as the theory predicts), the track records of the two employees
A and B are no longer exogenous. The crucial thing to note here, however, is that selection has been
based on observables. As has been observed in the literature, selection on observables per se does not
lead to a sample selection bias in the estimates.15 For such a bias to occur the (for the experimenter)
unobserved characteristics of C that drive her assignment decision should be correlated with the (for
the experimenter) unobserved characteristics of A that drive his entry decision. Given that all the
information subjects within a matching group have about each other comes from the experimenter (viz.
the track records) and the experiment is based on a stranger design, so reputational concerns are absent
by construction, there is no compelling reason at all for such a correlation to exist. Player A￿ s entry
decision can thus be studied independently from C￿ s assignment choice. For the very same reason it can
also be analyzed separately from C￿ s choice of organizational mode in periods 11 to 15.
In all speci￿cations of Table 7, the r-value in B￿ s track record (￿rst row) is a highly signi￿cant
determinant of A￿ s decision to enter. The higher rB is, the larger A￿ s entry propensity. This ￿nding is in
line with our ￿rst hypothesis. Entry is also signi￿cant more likely in the IH and the M-game as compared
to the IL-game. Apart from that, also player A￿ s own rA-value increases his probability of choosing to
enter. The e-values in the employees￿track records do not play a signi￿cant role. In particular, the level
of eA does not provide much information about A￿ s probability of entry.16 The time trend ￿ period￿is
15See e.g. Vella (1998, Section II) and Cameron and Trivedi (2005, Section 16.5.7). Paraphrasing the words of Vella (1998,
p. 129): ￿When the relationship between the work [assignment] decision and the wage [entry decision] is purely through
the observables, however, one can control for this by including the appropriate conditioning variables in the wage [entry
decision] equation. Thus, sample selection bias will not arise purely because of di⁄erences in observable characteristics.￿
Vella continues to explain that di⁄erences in observables across two samples ￿...is by no means necessary, or even indicative,
of selection bias.￿
16The insigni￿cance of eA in speci￿cations (2) and (4) of Table 7 is only partly due to the fairly substantial correlation
between eA and rA (potentially leading to problems of multi-collinearity). If we leave rA out of speci￿cation (2), we obtain
11Table 7: Random e⁄ects probit estimations of A choosing Enter
(1) (2) (3) (4)
rB 0.105*** 0.176*** 0.103*** 0.158***
(0.022) (0.033) (0.023) (0.044)
IH-game 0.702*** 0.754*** 0.548* 0.669*
(0.197) (0.198) (0.281) (0.367)
M-game 1.384*** 1.364*** 1.206*** 0.680**
(0.170) (0.172) (0.249) (0.316)
period -0.055*** -0.056*** -0.134*** -0.139***







second (per. 6 ￿ 10) -0.169 0.110
(0.437) (0.589)










constant -1.559*** -2.111*** -1.165*** -2.293***
(0.199) (0.286) (0.256) (0.460)
Log L -451.243 -445.721 -445.301 -214.979
N (clusters) 900 (60) 900 (60) 900 (60) 900 (60)
rho 0.187*** 0.158*** 0.193*** 0.202***
LR-chi2 120.354*** 131.399*** 132.238*** 50.572***
Remark: Standard errors in parentheses.
￿￿￿=
￿￿=
￿ indicates signi￿cance at the
1=5=10% level. Rho gives the proportion of overall variance contributed by the panel-
level component; its signi￿cance is based on a likelihood ratio test that rho=0. LR-
chi2 reports the test statistic from testing that all coe¢ cients (except the constant)
are zero.
12signi￿cantly negative, indicating that the propensity to enter decreases over time. We summarize our
main ￿nding from Table 7 in Result 1.
Result 1. The higher rB is, the more likely it is that player A enters.
We also calculated random e⁄ects probit estimates of the probability that B chooses to reward entry, for
the same four speci￿cations as in Table 7. (To save space these estimates are not reported.) We did so
mainly as a consistency check of whether B￿ s with a higher rB-value as measured in part one are (ceteris
paribus) indeed more likely to reward entry in part two. The estimates obtained reveal that this is the
case; a higher rB value makes it signi￿cantly more likely that B rewards entry. It is also found that the
e-values in the track records of A and B do not have a signi￿cant impact on B￿ s reward probability.
These ￿ndings are consistent. The higher rB in the track record of player B is, the more likely it is
that he will reward entry. This in turn makes it more attractive for A to enter, in line with what we
observe in Result 1. Player B￿ s track record thus contains valuable information about how he is going
to behave, which is actually used by player A to guide her entry decision. In the next subsection we
investigate whether this mechanism is recognized as such by player C when deciding on organizational
design.
Another important observation that follows from our ￿ndings is that, given the employees￿r-values,
their e-values do not provide useful additional information about their likely future behavior. Put
di⁄erently, the informational value of the individual track records lies in the r-values. The e-values are
informative only to the extent that they are correlated with the r-values.
4.3 Allocation of roles and organizational design
In part 2 player C makes two types of choices. First, in every period she decides on role assignment.
Observing the track records of her two employees, player C decides who gets the role of player A and
who becomes player B. Moreover, in periods 11 to 15 player C also chooses, before role assignment, the
game that is going to be played. These two di⁄erent choices are discussed in turn.
4.3.1 Role assignment
In studying the assignment choices we focus on the data of the ￿rst ten periods only where the game
is exogenously given. We do so because in periods 11 to 15 C￿ s assignment decision cannot be treated
independently from C￿ s choice of organizational design. These interdependent choices are studied in the
next subsection.
Tables 8 through 10 provide an overview of the assignment decisions in the three di⁄erent games.
These tables reveal whether the employee who obtained role B is the one with the higher r-value in his
track record (rA < rB) or whether this is the other way around (rA > rB), and similarly so for the
e-values. Owing to our role assignment procedure based on the ranking of ri-values, the two employees
within a ￿rm never had the same r-value. This does not apply to the ei-values though, explaining the
additional row where eA = eB in these tables.
a coe¢ cient estimate of 0:056 for eA with a p-value of 0:084. If we leave rA out of speci￿cation (4), the coe¢ cient for eA
remains insigni￿cant (p = 0:460).
13Table 8: Assignment of roles in IL-game (periods 1-10)
rA > rB rA < rB Total
eA > eB 54 (36%) 8 (5%) 62 (41%)
eA = eB 6 (4%) 11 (7%) 17 (11%)
eA < eB 4 (3%) 67 (45%) 71 (47%)
Total 64 (43%) 86 (57%) 150 (100%)
Table 9: Assignment of roles in IH-game (periods 1-10)
rA > rB rA < rB Total
eA > eB 43 (29%) 6 (4%) 49 (33%)
eA = eB 4 (3%) 8 (5%) 12 (8%)
eA < eB 8 (5%) 81 (54%) 89 (59%)
Total 55 (37%) 95 (63%) 150 (100%)
From the observed assignment patterns it immediately follows that our second hypothesis is rejected;
players C do not predominantly assign the role of player B to the employee with the higher r-value in
his track record. In the two inspection games it does hold that C is (weakly) more likely to assign role B
to the employee with the higher r-value. In the motivation game this is actually the other way around.
There player C is more likely to assign role A to the higher r-value within her work force.17 Given the
fairly high correlation between subjects￿r and e-values, the order of e-values among the two employees
typically corresponds with the order of r-values. Assignment on the basis of relative e-values thus often
(but not always) coincides with allocation on the basis of relative r-values.
Comparing assignment patterns of r-values across games, we ￿nd that these do not di⁄er between the
two inspection games. But they are signi￿cantly di⁄erent for the motivation game; the average value of
rB (per individual player C) is lower in the motivation game as compared to the average value of rB in the
inspection games.18 As a result of this, managers in the M-game (players B) have on average an r-score
that does not di⁄er signi￿cantly from managers in the I-game (players A).19 This ￿nding contrasts with
the theoretical prediction that managers in the M-game will be more empathic than managers in the
17To account for the multiple assignment decisions per player C, we formally test this as follows. For each individual
player C we compute the average values of rB and rA for each (exogenous) game separately. We then compare these
individual means rB and rA by means of signrank tests. In the IL-game there is no signi￿cant di⁄erence (p = 0:2058)
while for the IH-game rB is signi￿cantly larger than rA (p = 0:0082). For the M-game rB is signi￿cantly lower than rA
(p = 0:0001).
18These conclusions are based on comparing the means rB of individual player C￿ s across games. For IL versus M
and IH versus M signrank tests (for matched pairs) yield p-values of 0:0140 and 0:0035, respectively. For IL versus IH a
ranksum test (unmatched data) gives p = 0:6732.
19This follows from comparing (per individual player C) rB under game M with rA under games IL and IH, respectively.
Using signrank tests we obtain a p-value of 0:4715 for M versus IL and of 1:000 for M versus IH.
Table 10: Assignment of roles in M-game (periods 1-10)
rA > rB rA < rB Total
eA > eB 165 (55%) 18 (6%) 183 (61%)
eA = eB 24 (8%) 8 (3%) 32 (11%)
eA < eB 7 (2%) 78 (26%) 85 (28%)
Total 196 (65%) 104 (35%) 300 (100%)
14I-game.
Result 2. Players C quite often do not assign the role of player B to the employee with the higher
r-value. In the inspection games C is (weakly) more likely to assign role B to the high-r employee, in
the motivation game she is more likely to give role B to the low-r employee.
Result 2 is opposite to what we expected. Especially in the M-game it is important for player C to
stimulate entry, because the payo⁄ after Out is low, and assigning the high-r employee to role B appears
an e⁄ective instrument to do so (cf. Result 1). Yet the majority of player C￿ s does not do this.
A potential explanation why C￿ s in game M tend to assign role B to the low-r employee is that they
naively assume that A￿ s and B￿ s decisions are (only) driven by their own eA and rB values, respectively.
In particular, C￿ s may overlook that A￿ s actual entry decision is mainly guided by the value of rB. If
C￿ s indeed have such naive expectations, they would prefer to assign the high-e employee to role A and
the low-r employee to role B. This follows because C gets the same as player B in game M and thus is
necessarily better o⁄ when A enters instead of staying out (and she is best o⁄ when B chooses no reward
in reaction). This could explain the direction in the assignment patterns we observe; high (ei;ri) types
typically get role A whereas low (ei;ri) types usually get role B. Moreover, one would expect naive C￿ s
to focus predominantly on relative e-values in order to stimulate entry, because stimulating no reward
in reaction to entry is useful only when entry can be induced.
For the two inspection games matters are less clear under naive expectations. Surely, C then prefers
to give role B to the high-r employee. This maximizes the probability that B chooses to reward after A
enters. But given that C gets the same as A in these games, entry is now risky for player C. She may
end up with the lowest payo⁄ when B decides not to reward A￿ s entry choice. It is therefore a priori
unclear whether a naive C wants to increase the probability of entry by assigning the high-e employee
to role A, or whether she prefers to avoid the worst outcome (Enter, No reward) in this game by giving
the low-e employee role A. Under naive expectations one thus expects that allocation decisions may be
driven by both the relative r-values and the relative e-values of the two employees.
Given the substantial correlation between ei and ri, it is di¢ cult to identify precisely their separate
e⁄ects on the probability of obtaining role B. But the random e⁄ects probit estimates in Table 11 provide
suggestive evidence. These estimates are calculated as follows. For each allocation decision of player C
we focus on the employee with the lower subject id in player C￿ s current group of employees. Because
subject id￿ s are allocated at random, this corresponds to a random selection of one of the two employees
player C has in a given period. For these employees we estimate the probability that they are assigned
role B, where the random e⁄ects procedure takes account of the fact that we have multiple allocation
decisions per player C within our sample. Two di⁄erent speci￿cations are estimated. In the ￿rst the
data from the two inspection games are e⁄ectively pooled, in the second they are treated separately.
Two main explanatory variables are considered: (i) the di⁄erence in r-values between the lower id
employee and the other employee (r1 ￿ r2) and (ii) the di⁄erence in e-values between them (e1 ￿ e2).
These variables are interacted with game dummies to test whether their impact di⁄er across di⁄erent
games. As before we also include the game dummies, a time trend ￿ period￿and a dummy for potential
order e⁄ects (i.e. ￿ second￿ ) as controls.
The results for the motivation game are clear cut. In this game C￿ s are mostly concerned with
getting the low-e employee in role B and thus assigning the high-e value to role A. This follows from
15Table 11: RE probit estimations of (lower id) employee getting role B
I-games IL and IH
pooled separate
r1 ￿ r2 -0.031 -0.032
(0.020) (0.020)
(r1 ￿ r2) ￿ I-game 0.079***
(0.028)
e1 ￿ e2 -0.083*** -0.081***
(0.030) (0.030)




(r1 ￿ r2) ￿ IL 0.089***
(0.034)
(r1 ￿ r2) ￿ IH 0.048
(0.036)
(e1 ￿ e2) ￿ IL 0.056
(0.047)












Log L -390.837 -388.040
N (clusters) 600 (60) 600 (60)
rho 0.001 0.004
LR-chi2 49.776*** 55.369***




ni￿cance at the 1=5=10% level. The lower id employee is labelled
employee 1, the other employee is labelled employee 2. Rho gives
the proportion of overall variance contributed by the panel-level
component; its signi￿cance is based on a likelihood ratio test
that rho=0. LR-chi2 reports the test statistic from testing that
all coe¢ cients (except the constant) are zero. Estimates are
based on period 1 ￿ 10 data only.
16the fact that the coe¢ cient of e1 ￿ e2 is negative and highly signi￿cant, whereas the one belonging to
r1 ￿r2 is insigni￿cant. For the two inspection games opposite results are found. When the two versions
of the inspection game are considered jointly, relative r-values do play a role. The interaction term
between r1 ￿ r2 and the I-game dummy is highly signi￿cant. The employees relative e-values are then
immaterial.20 It thus appears that in the inspection game players C predominantly focus on getting
the high r-value in role B. When the IL and the IH game are considered in isolation, however, a more
nuanced picture emerges. In the IL-game players C appears mostly concerned with getting the high
r-value in role B, whereas in game IH C￿ s seem to focus on getting the low e-value employee in role A.
Note, however, that given the high correlation between ei and ri, assigning the higher r-value to role B
typically coincides with assigning the lower e-value to role A. Therefore, for many allocation decisions
this shift in focus does not matter.
These patterns make sense when C￿ s have naive expectations as described earlier. In the two in-
spection games C￿ s will be mostly concerned with avoiding the very unattractive outcome (Enter, No
reward), and they think they can do so either by having the higher r-value in role B and/or the lower
e-value in role A. In the motivation game players C particularly would like to stimulate entry. Naive C￿ s
think that this is best accomplished by assigning the higher e-value to role A.
The observation that C￿ s may have naive expectations is in line with earlier experimental ￿ndings that
people tend to analyze extensive form games in a forward rather than in a backward manner. Johnson
et al. (2002) consider a three-round alternating o⁄er bargaining game in which the pie up for division
shrinks over time. The actual pie sizes in each of the three rounds were hidden in boxes on the computer
screen, which could be opened by moving the cursor into the box. The computer software recorded
which box was opened, for how long, the order in which the boxes were opened etc.. Strikingly, most
subjects focused on the ￿rst round box and did not su¢ ciently look ahead. In a non-negligible fraction
of observations, subjects did not even open the round two and round three boxes.21 In our setting naive
C￿ s also do not backward induct su¢ ciently. They simply look forward at the ￿rst (entry) decision taken
by player A, overlooking the fact that this decision is a⁄ected by player A￿ s expectation about B￿ s likely
choice (for which rB provides relevant information).
The above discussion suggests that (naive) players C make suboptimal allocation decisions, especially
in the motivation game. Result 1 namely indicates that entry is best stimulated by assigning the higher r-
value to role B. On the other hand, such an allocation also stimulates B to reward entry and ￿conditional
on entry ￿C would be better o⁄ if B chooses no reward instead. To assess the overall e⁄ect we therefore
investigate how player C￿ s pro￿ts vary with her allocation decision. The upper panel of Table 12 presents
random e⁄ects regression estimates of player C￿ s pro￿t for each of the three games separately. Here the
data is again restricted to the ￿rst ten periods in which the game is exogenously given. As explanatory
variables we include the track record characteristics of C￿ s two employees, together with an order dummy
and a time trend.
First focusing on the M-game, we observe that the e-values of players A and B do not signi￿cantly
a⁄ect player C￿ s pro￿ts. The rB-value, on the other hand, signi￿cantly increases pro￿ts. Player C
would thus make more pro￿t if she would give the employee with the higher r-value role B. Because
20This can be concluded from the fact that the coe¢ cients belonging to e1￿e2 and (e1￿e2)￿I-game are not signi￿cantly
di⁄erent from each other.
21In a class room experiment Rubinstein (1999) also ￿nds that people have a natural tendency to analyze extensive form
games forward rather than backwards.
17Table 12: Random e⁄ects regressions of player C￿ s pro￿t
IL-game IH-game M-game
rB 1.067 1.422 16.179**
(4.860) (6.493) (7.546)
rA -8.550 6.863 10.334
(5.390) (7.180) (7.445)
eA 0.272 0.538 10.254
(3.795) (6.944) (6.257)
eB -7.182** 6.528 8.867
(3.523) (6.937) (6.759)
second 61.553* 47.736 104.712**
(34.913) (42.818) (52.354)
period -6.770 -7.931 -27.120***
(4.933) (6.365) (7.705)
constant 474.848*** 316.958*** 392.742***
(42.017) (41.344) (56.861)
Overall R2 0.082 0.040 0.072
N (clusters) 150 (30) 150 (30) 300 (60)
rho 0.233 0.162 0.248
Wald-chi2 10.966* 5.379 27.391***
Actual pro￿t 421 341.47 438.40
Optimal pro￿t 416.04a 454.96a




ni￿cance at the 1=5=10% level. Rho gives the proportion of
overall variance contributed by the panel-level component. In
all three speci￿cations a Lagrange multiplier test for random ef-
fects is insigni￿cant. Wald-chi2 reports the test statistic from
testing that all coe¢ cients (except the constant) are zero.
a
indicates that the Optimal pro￿t di⁄ers signi￿cantly from the
Actual pro￿t according to a signrank test (1% level)
18she typically does not do so (cf. Result 2), allocation decisions in the motivation game are indeed
suboptimal. In regard to the inspection games no signi￿cant e⁄ects are found for the employees￿r-
scores. An explanation for this is that a higher rB-value not only makes outcome (Enter, Reward) more
likely, but also the worst possible outcome (Enter, No reward).22 The regression results suggest that
the payo⁄ consequences of these two opposing e⁄ects cancel out. Somewhat surprising, however, we do
￿nd that eB has a signi￿cant negative impact on pro￿ts in the IL-game. A plausible explanation here is
that, because eB and rB are highly correlated, their independent e⁄ects cannot be well isolated. Jointly
the two coe¢ cients belonging to eB and rB are insigni￿cant, suggesting that also here (like in game IH),
pro￿t levels are largely insensitive to assignment.23
To explore this issue further, the lower panel of Table 12 reports the average estimated pro￿ts players
C could have obtained from using the ￿ optimal￿allocation decision as suggested by the pro￿t regressions.
For the M-game this corresponds to always assigning role B to the employee with the highest r-value.
If players C consistently do so, the estimated pro￿t level on average equals 455. This appears to be
signi￿cantly larger than the actual average pro￿ts of 438 (signrank test, p = 0:0000). In case of the IL-
game the suggested optimal assignment corresponds to having the low e-value in role B (and if employees
have equal e-values, the one with the higher r-value should get role B). If this assignment rule would be
followed, players C would actually obtain signi￿cantly less than with their actual assignment decisions
(again signrank test, p = 0:0014). Overall we conclude that players C make suboptimal assignment
decisions only in the motivation game.
Result 3. In the motivation game Players C make more pro￿t when they assign the high-r employee to
role B. In the inspection games pro￿t levels are largely insensitive to the assignment of the employees.
4.3.2 Game choice
We ￿nally look at the choices players C make in the ￿nal ￿ve periods of part 2. Player C then decides
on both the organizational mode and on role assignment and therefore these decisions are considered
jointly. Table 13 ￿rst provides an overview of the actual choices made. With respect to assignment this
table indicates whether the employee with the higher r-value obtains role A (rA > rB) or whether s/he
obtains role B (rB > rA).
Regarding game choice it can be observed that when player C chooses between IL and M, she is
about equally likely to choose either game. But when the choice is between IH and M, she chooses the
motivation game in around 73% of the cases. In line with theoretical predictions, therefore, C is more
likely to choose M over IH than M over IL. With regard to assignment patterns the ￿ndings are the
same as before. In the motivation game players C allocate role B to the low r-value employee in overall
72% of the cases where this game is endogenously chosen. This compares well with the 68% observed
for the exogenous M-game (cf. Table 10). Taking the two inspection games together the corresponding
percentages are 36% for the endogenous treatments and 39% in the exogenous games. Hence, also
when the inspection game is endogenously chosen, player C is more likely to assign role B to the high-r
employee. These ￿ndings corroborate Result 2.
22This follows from running separate RE probit estimates of the probability of outcome (Enter, Reward) and (Enter, No
reward), respectively.
23The coe¢ cients belonging to eB and rB are jointly signi￿cant only in the regression for the M-game.
19Table 13: Game choices and assignment by session
Session Game IL Game IH Game M Total
rA > rB rA < rB rA > rB rA < rB rA > rB rA < rB
1 13 (17%) 26 (35%) 24 (32%) 12 (16%) 75 (100%)
2 12 (16%) 23 (31%) 36 (48%) 4 (5%) 75 (100%)
3 11 (15%) 13 (17%) 35 (47%) 16 (21%) 75 (100%)
4 5 (7%) 11 (15%) 38 (51%) 21 (28%) 75 (100%)
All 25 (8%) 49 (16%) 16 (5%) 24 (8%) 133 (44%) 53 (18%) 300 (100%)
In order to explore which employees￿characteristics drive game choice we estimate a multinomial
probit model with the dependent variable attaining four possible values: (1) choose game M and give
the low-r employee role B, (2) choose game M and assign the high-r employee role B, (3) choose game
I and give the low-r employee role B and (4) choose game I and assign the high-r employee role B.
To take account of the multiple decisions per individual player C, observations are clustered using the
id￿ s of player C as the clustering variable. Apart from the track record characteristics of player C￿ s two
employees, we also include as explanatory variables a dummy equal to one i⁄ IH is the alternative to
game M and a variable ￿M ￿ ￿I measuring the di⁄erence in average realized pro￿ts player C obtained
from the two games in the ￿rst ten periods (where these games were exogenously given). Intuitively, one
would expect that C is more likely to choose game M when IH is the alternative and when game M
yielded her higher pro￿ts than game I did in the past. We also include a time trend ￿ period￿and player
C￿ s own track record characteristics as controls.
Instead of the estimated coe¢ cients, Table 14 reports for each outcome the estimated increase in
probability of observing the corresponding outcome (i.e. marginal e⁄ects). From these estimates a
consistent pattern emerges regarding game choice. First, the higher eHigh is, the more likely it becomes
that player C chooses the M-game: The other variables in the employees￿track records are typically
insigni￿cant.24 Hence the estimates do not lend support to the hypothesis that the higher the value of
rHigh within player C￿ s work force is, the more likely it is that the M-game is chosen. Second, the single
two other important determinants of game choice are the pro￿t di⁄erence ￿M ￿ ￿I and the M versus
IH dummy. Not surprisingly, the better (relative) experience player C has with game M in the past, the
more likely she is to choose this game over the inspection game. The same applies when the alternative
to the M-mode is worse, i.e. IH instead of IL.
Result 4. (i) Players C￿ s choice between the motivation game and the inspection game is not guided by
the ri-values in her employees￿track records. From these records only the highest e-value eHigh matters;
the higher eHigh, the more likely it is that C chooses game M. (ii) player C is more likely to choose
game M over game IH than over game IL:
Even though role assignment is suboptimal in the M-game (cf. Result 3), subjects may still make close
to optimal game choices. To explore this we perform random e⁄ects regressions of player C￿ s pro￿ts
24The single exception here is the marginal e⁄ect of rHigh on the probability of observing the joint choice of game M
and rA < rB. In the multinomial probit estimation, however, the joint hypothesis that the coe¢ cients belonging to rHigh
are all zero cannot be rejected (p = 0:1637). Therefore, rHigh plays a minor role at most in explaining the variation across
the four di⁄erent outcomes.
20Table 14: Estimated marginal e⁄ects on C￿ s joint game and assignment choice
game M game M game I game I
rA > rB rA < rB rA > rB rA < rB
rHigh -0.0046 0.0283* -0.0196 -0.0041
(0.0199) (0.0159) (0.0144) (0.0167)
rLow 0.0321 0.0366 0.0081 -0.0767
(0.0512) (0.0438) (0.0276) (0.0501)
eLow -0.0356 0.0236 0.0090 0.0030
(0.0256) (0.0153) (0.0126) (0.0196)
eHigh 0.0586*** -0.0038 -0.0219 -0.0330**
(0.0191) (0.0147) (0.0137) (0.0156)
rC -0.0385 0.0181 -0.0177 0.0380
(0.0468) (0.0376) (0.0263) (0.0308)
eC -0.0005 0.0121 -0.0289* 0.0173
(0.0235) (0.146) (0.0150) (0.0142)
￿M ￿ ￿I 0.0017*** -0.0006 -0.0002 -0.0010**
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003)
M versus IH 0.0141 0.2291*** -0.0852 -0.1581**
(0.0847) (0.0692) (0.0544) (0.0642)
period -0.0243 0.0064 0.0014 0.0165
(0.0204) (0.0153) (0.0124) (0.0208)




at the 1=5=10% level. rHigh (rLow) refers to the r-value of the employee
with the higher (lower) r in his track record. eHigh and eLow are de￿ned
similarly. Marginal e⁄ects follow from multinomial probit estimates with
player C as the clustering variable (data from periods 11 ￿ 15 only).
21Table 15: Average predicted pro￿ts, average actual pro￿ts and game choice
Pro￿t Game IL chosen over M M chosen over IL IH chosen over M M chosen over IH
(n = 74) (n = 76) (n = 40) (n = 110)
IL 431 442
IH 323 268
Pred. M 377 372 419 413
Mopt 395 401 444 452
Actual 430 384 325 422
Remark: The ￿rst four rows report the average (empirically) predicted pro￿ts in the four di⁄erent
games. These predictions are based on random e⁄ects regressions of player C￿ s pro￿ts in periods 11
to 15, for each chosen game separately (i.e. regressions similar to those in Table 12). MOpt gives
the estimated pro￿t player C would obtain under optimal role assignment in the M-game. Within
columns all di⁄erences are signi￿cant according to a signrank test (1% level).
similar to those reported in Table 12, but now restricted to periods 11-15 only.25 These estimates
are subsequently used to predict the pro￿ts player C in reality may obtain from either one of the two
organizational modes. Table 15 provides an overview of the average (empirically) predicted pro￿ts,
together with the average actual pro￿ts in the ￿nal row. The table also lists the average estimated pro￿t
player C could have obtained under optimal role assignment in the M-game (see the row labelled MOpt).
Some interesting observations can be made from Table 15. First, compared to the theoretical pre-
dictions under sel￿sh preferences, the M-mode does much better than predicted (predicted pro￿ts equal
280), whereas the two I-games do slightly worse (theoretically predicted pro￿ts of 440 and 360, re-
spectively). This ￿nding is well in line with the many earlier experimental studies showing that social
preferences may greatly enhance e¢ ciency, especially under informal implicit contracts. Here the direct
consequence is that the pro￿ts player C can attain under the IH-game are in practice signi￿cantly less
than under the M-game. Subjects by and large realize this, because in 73% of the cases players C opt
for the M-game when the alternative is the IH-game. Players C thus broadly recognize that the social
preferences within their work force make the M-mode relatively more attractive. Second, although role
assignment under the M-game is suboptimal and signi￿cantly reduces pro￿ts, the average loss in pro￿ts
is relatively small in absolute magnitude (around 20 ￿ 40 points in the periods with endogenous game
choice).
Overall the following general picture emerges. For players C the motivation game is attractive only if
entry can be induced in this game. They naively think that this can be best accomplished by allocating
role A to the employee with the highest ei-value. Player Cs are therefore likely to choose game M only
when this eHigh-value is relatively high. In case eHigh is low Cs are more likely to choose the inspection
game and will assign this player the role of B. A rationale for this assignment is that player C hopes
to avoid the very bad outcome (Enter, No reward) in this way. Allocation decisions are naive in the
sense that Cs seem to overlook the signi￿cant impact of B￿ s track record (in particular rB ) on A￿ s entry
choices, especially in game M where this relationship is of vital importance. They therefore mainly
look at the employee￿ s own track record to form expectations about how he would behave in role A.
This leads to suboptimal allocation choices in game M. In turn, the choice between games is distorted
25Compared to Table 12 the dummies ￿ second￿and ￿ endo￿have been dropped and in the regression for the M-game a
0=1 dummy has been added that indicates whether IH (instead of IL) is the alternative.
22as well, because it is mainly guided by the employees￿ei-values. Nevertheless, the loss in pro￿ts due
to a distorted allocation of employees is rather small under the M-game and players Cs in general do
correctly realize that social preferences make mode M more attractive than mode IH. They thus seem
to recognize the general impact of social preferences, but do not make full e⁄ective use of it.
5 Conclusion
Organizations di⁄er widely in the practices they use to motivate their employees. Some organizations
heavily rely on formal contracts with explicit incentives and active monitoring. Here an important task of
managers is to supervise and inspect workers in order to detect potential shirking. Other organizational
modes are predominantly based on implicit informal agreements that hard work will be rewarded. In
this case the main task of managers is to inspire and to motivate the work force. In these organizations
employment contracts are largely incomplete and a substitute mechanism is needed to convince workers
that the organization is indeed committed to reward high e⁄ort. Apart from repeated interaction and
reputation (cf. Kreps (1990)), appointing managers that empathize with their employees may provide
such a commitment (cf. Rotemberg and Sloner (1993)). This motivational mode where managers with
social preferences are hired saves on the costs of using a formal performance measurement system.
In this paper we test several predictions concerning organizational design by means of a laboratory
experiment. Theory predicts that the motivation-mode is viable only if managers are su¢ ciently empathic
whereas for the inspection-mode this is not the case. The more empathic employees within the work
force should therefore be given the managerial positions in the M-mode (but not in the I-mode). And
the more empathic these managers are, the more attractive organizational mode M becomes relative to
the inspection mode.
Our main ￿ndings are that ￿rm owners by and large overlook the signi￿cant impact of a manager￿ s
preference type on worker behavior in the M-mode. They naively assume that the worker￿ s e⁄ort decision
is mainly guided by the preference type of the worker himself. They therefore allocate roles suboptimally
in the M-mode, with workers rather than managers being the more empathic types. As a result of this,
choices between organizational modes di⁄er from theoretical predictions as well. Nevertheless, owners
do correctly realize that the (potential) existence of social preferences within their work force makes the
motivation mode relatively more attractive. Taken together, we conclude that owners in our experiment
do recognize that social preferences matter, but do not make full e⁄ective use of the available preference
types within their work force when drafting their organizational design.
Appendix: basic model of endogenous organizational design
In the experiment subjects are confronted with the simple games depicted in Figure 1. To motivate our
choice of monetary payo⁄s in these games, we consider in this Appendix a bare bone reduced form model
of endogenous organizational design. Because the main purpose here is to justify our parameter choices,
in this model we abstract away from the owner￿ s assignment decision.
A ￿rm consists of three agents: the owner who owns the ￿rm, a manager hired to run the ￿rm on
her behalf and a worker doing the productive work. The worker can either put in low e⁄ort (￿ shirk￿ )
23or high e⁄ort (￿ work￿ ). In the former case the value of his productivity equals v0 whereas in the latter
case it is v1 (here all parameters are positive). The worker￿ s disutility of putting in high e⁄ort equals g.
Therefore, a sel￿sh worker will shirk if no additional measures are taken.
One way to motivate the worker to put in high e⁄ort is to set up a performance monitoring system.
We assume that such a system, when fully implemented, always induces the worker to work. It brings
about three types of costs though. First, there are the costs k of setting up and installing the monitoring
technology. Investments in technological equipment and organizational procedures are needed to allow
accurate measurement of the worker￿ s productivity.26 Second, h denotes the ￿rm￿ s inspection costs. Even
with the monitoring technology in place, scarce resources like the manager￿ s time need to be devoted to
monitor the worker. Third, the worker dislikes being monitored because it gives him the feeling of being
controlled (cf. Frey (1993), Falk and Kosfeld (2006)), leading to a disutility of d. We assume that the
overall costs of the formal monitoring system fall short of the net bene￿ts of getting the worker to work:
k + h + d < v1 ￿ v0 ￿ g: (A1)
Therefore, in the absence of alternative incentive instruments, the ￿rm would bene￿t from using a formal
monitoring system. As in the main text we will refer to this as the ￿ inspection mode￿ , or I-mode in short.
In regard to compensation we assume that the worker receives a ￿xed wage wI. The manager is paid on
the basis of performance pay, getting a share fI 2 (0;1) of the ￿rm￿ s net pro￿ts (while the owner gets
the remainder).
An alternative way to motivate the worker is to promise him a bonus whenever he puts in high e⁄ort.
Because e⁄ort itself is non-contractable, this bonus payment cannot be made part of a formal contract
though. The incentive system thus relies on an implicit contract that the promise will be kept. This
type of organizational design is labelled as the motivation mode, or M-mode in short. Here the worker
receives a wage wM and is promised a bonus bM on top of that if he exerts high e⁄ort. The manager
gets a fraction fM 2 (0;1) of ￿rm pro￿ts. This performance pay gives a sel￿sh manager an incentive to
renege on the promised bonus payment.
Overall the game model of Figure A1 results. First the owner chooses the organizational mode. If the
M-mode is chosen, the worker moves next by deciding whether to shirk or the work. Only if the worker
works, the manager decides whether to pay the promised bonus or not. (Here the implicit assumption
is that the manager never wants to reward shirking with a bonus.) In the I-mode the manager moves
before the worker does. The manager either commits to monitor or not to do so. In the former case the
worker is assumed to work, because the disutility of working falls short of the costs of getting caught
shirking. If the manager does not monitor, the worker chooses between shirking or working. The players￿
payo⁄s then follow from the assumptions made above.
[ Insert Figure A1 about here ]
If players are sel￿sh, the predicted outcome is easily determined by backwards induction. A sel￿sh
manager will not pay the bonus in the M-mode (given fM ￿ bM > 0). Anticipating this, a sel￿sh worker
26These costs are equivalent to the investments in veri￿cation technology required under explicit contracts in the exper-
iments of Fehr and Schmidt (2000) and Fehr et al. (2007).
24Figure A1. The basic (reduced form) game 
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πi: monetary payoffs for player i∈{O,Man,W};    d = worker’s disutility of being monitored; 
v1 (v0) = value productivity if worker works (shirks);  wM (wI) = wage worker in M (I) mode; 
g = worker’s cost of effort;          bM = size of bonus payment in M-mode; 
k = costs of setting up monitoring technology;    fM (fI) = profit sharing fraction manager in M (I) mode. 
h = firm’s costs of inspection;           will shirk under this organizational design. In the inspection mode a sel￿sh worker will shirk if not
monitored by the manager, therefore the manager will monitor him.27 The outcome is that the worker
does work under this mode, at the expense of the overall costs of the monitoring technology (k +h+d).
Given assumption (A1), under sel￿sh preferences the I-mode is more e¢ cient than the M-mode is. Hence
if the payo⁄ parameters are such that the owner shares in these e¢ ciency gains, she would choose the
I-mode over the M-mode.28 It would be more e¢ cient, however, if the worker could be motivated to
work in the M-mode, as this would save the overall costs of the monitoring technology.
Of course, in a fully ￿ edged model the compensation parameters wM; wI; bM; fM and fI would
be endogenous. Here we just make the following simplifying assumptions. First, mainly for practical
reasons we focus on the case in which fM = fI = 1
2.29 The share fraction is thus the same for the two
organizational modes, such that the owner does not simply prefer one mode over the other because she






fI ￿ (v1 ￿ k ￿ h) + g + d
1 + fI
; and bM =
fM ￿ (v1 ￿ v0) + g
1 + fM
The wage level wM (= v0=3) ensures that all ￿rm members earn the same when the worker chooses to
shirk in the M-mode. Similarly so, wI is set such that all ￿rm members get the same when the manager
monitors in the I-mode. Finally, bM makes that all members earn the same when the manager pays the
bonus in the M-mode after the worker decided to work. E⁄ectively, payo⁄ di⁄erences are minimized in
the three most relevant outcomes and potential e¢ ciency gains are shared equally.
Under these assumptions, the resulting payo⁄s in the two modes follow directly from the exogenous
production technology parameters appearing in inequality (A1). The payo⁄s appearing in Figure 1 then
result from making the following choices:
v0 = 840; v1 = 1740; g = 90; k = 180; h = 260[100] and d = 130[50]
where for h and d the ￿rst value refers to IH and the second to IL.
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